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ABSTRACT
Group based anonymization is the most widely studied ap-
proach for privacy preserving data publishing. This includes
k-anonymity, l-diversity, and t-closeness, to name a few. The
goal of this paper is to raise a fundamental issue on the pri-
vacy exposure of the current group based approach. This has
been overlooked in the past. The group based anonymiza-
tion approach basically hides each individual record behind a
group to preserve data privacy. If not properly anonymized,
patterns can actually be derived from the published data
and be used by the adversary to breach individual privacy.
For example, from the medical records released, if patterns
such as people from certain countries rarely suffer from some
disease can be derived, then the information can be used
to imply linkage of other people in an anonymized group
with this disease with higher likelihood. We call the derived
patterns from the published data the foreground knowledge.
This is in contrast to the background knowledge that the ad-
versary may obtain from other channels as studied in some
previous work. Finally, we show by experiments that the
attack is realistic in the privacy benchmark dataset under
the traditional group based anonymization approach.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.2.0.a [Information Technology and Systems]:
Database Management—General
General Terms
Algorithms, Experimentation, Security
Keywords
privacy preservation, data publishing, l-diversity, k-
anonymity
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A major technique used in privacy preservation data pub-
lishing is group based anonymization, whereby records in the
given relation are partitioned into groups and each group
must ensure some property such as diversity so as to satisfy
the privacy requirement while maintaining sufficient data
utility. There are many privacy models associated with
group based anonymization such as k-anonymity [24], l-
diversity [21], t-closeness [17], (k, e)-anonymity [30], Injector
[18] and m-confidentiality [27]. It seems that this technique
is sound for privacy preserving data publishing. However,
when examined more carefully, they all suffer from one fun-
damental privacy violation problem, which is overlooked in
the past. The main cause of this problem is that the util-
ity that is maintained in the anonymzied table can help the
adversary to breach individual privacy.
In the literature, background knowledge [21, 15, 22, 27,
18] such as the rarity of a disease among a certain ethnic
group or the pattern of age or gender for a disease can be
used by the adversary to breach individual privacy. In this
paper, we show that such knowledge can be mined from
the published data or the anonymized data to compromise
individual privacy. In fact, one of the main purposes of
data publishing is data mining which is mainly about the
discovery of patterns from the published data.
Let us illustrate the problem with an example. Suppose
a table T is to be anonymized for publication. Table T has
two kinds of attributes, the quasi-identifier (QI) attributes
and the sensitive attribute. The QI attributes can be used
as an identifier in the table. [24] points out that in a real
dataset, most individuals can be uniquely identified by three
QI attributes, namely sex, date of birth and 5-digit zip code.
The sensitive attribute contains some sensitive values. In
our example, Table 1 is the given table T where one of the
QI attributes is “Nationality” and the sensitive attribute is
“Disease” containing sensitive values such as Heart Disease
and HIV. Note that there can be other QI attributes in this
table such as sex and zip code. For the sake of illustration,
we list attribute “Nationality” only. Assume that each tuple
in the table is owned by an individual and each individual
owns at most one tuple.
Suppose that we want to anonymize T and publish the
anonymized dataset T ∗ to satisfy some privacy require-
ments. Typically, T ∗ consists of a set of anonymized groups
(in short, A-groups), where each A-group is a set of tuples
with a multi-set of sensitive values that are linked with the
A-group. Depending on the anonymization mechanism, each
A-group may correspond to either a set of quasi-identifer
Name Nationality ... Disease
Alex American ... Heart Disease
Bob Japanese ... Flu
Japanese ... Flu
Japanese ... Stomach Virus
French ... HIV
Japanese ... Diabetes
... ... ...
Table 1: An example
Nationality ... GID
American ... L1
Japanese ... L1
Japanese ... L2
Japanese ... L2
French ... L3
Japanese ... L3
... ... ...
GID Disease
L1 Heart Disease
L1 Flu
L2 Flu
L2 Stomach Virus
L3 HIV
L3 Diabetes
... ...
(a) QI Table (b) Sensitive table
Table 2: A 2-diverse dataset anonymized from Ta-
ble 1
(QI) values or a single generalized QI value. An attribute
GID is added for the ID of the A-group. Such an anonymized
dataset is generated as a result of group-based anonymiza-
tion commonly adopted in the literature of data publishing
[3, 16, 29, 27, 18, 17] (including k-anonymity, l-diversity,
t-closeness and a vast number of other privacy models).
For illustration, a simplified setting of the l-diversity
model [21] is used as a privacy requirement for published
data T ∗. An A-group is said to be l-diverse or satisfy l-
diversity if in the A-group the number of occurrences of any
sensitive value is at most 1/l of the group size. A table sat-
isfies l-diversity (or it is l-diverse) if all A-groups in it are
l-diverse. Table 2 satisfies 2-diversity. The intention is that
each individual cannot be linked to a disease with a prob-
ability of more than 0.5. However, does this table protect
individual privacy sufficiently?
Let us examine the A-group with GID equal to L1 as
shown in Table 2. We also refer to the A-group by Li. In L1,
Heart Disease and Flu are values of the sensitive attribute
Disease. It seems that each of the two individuals, Alex and
Bob, in this group has a 50% chance of linking to Heart
Disease (Flu). The reason why the chance is interpreted
as 50% is that the analysis is based on this group locally
without any additional information.
However, from the entire published table containing mul-
tiple groups, the adversary may discover some interesting
patterns globally. For example, suppose the published table
consists of many A-groups like L2 with all Japanese with no
occurrence of Heart Disease. At the same time, there are
many A-groups like L3 containing some Japanese without
Heart Disease. The pattern that Japanese rarely suffer from
Heart Disease can be uncovered. Note that it is very likely
that such an anonymized data is published by conventional
anonymization methods, given the fact that Heart Disease
occurs rarely among Japanese. With the pattern uncovered,
the adversary can say that Bob, being a Japanese, has less
chance of having Heart Disease. S/he can deduce that Alex,
being an American, has a higher chance of having Heart
Disease. The intended 50% threshold is thus violated.
1.1 Foreground Knowledge Attack
The anonymized data can be seen as an imprecise or un-
certain data [8, 9], and an adversary can uncover interest-
ing patterns since the published data must maintain high
data utility [29, 30, 27]. We call the uncovered patterns
the foreground knowledge (which is implicitly inside the ta-
ble) in contrast to the background knowledge, studied by
existing works [21, 17, 30, 27], which the adversary requires
much effort to obtain from somewhere outside the table.
Since it is easy to obtain the foreground knowledge from the
anonymized dataset, all existing works suffer from privacy
breaches.
In Table 2, there are only two local possible worlds for
assigning the disease values to the two individuals in L1:
(1) w1 : Alex is linked to Heart Disease and Bob is linked to
Flu and (2) w2 : Alex is linked to Flu and Bob is linked to
Heart Disease. To construct a probability distribution over
the domain of the real world, a simplest definition is based
on the assumption that all the possible worlds are equally
likely, or each world has the same probability.
If we publish a group L1 alone, the random world assump-
tion is a good principle in the absence of other informa-
tion. However, when several groups are published together
as typically the case, the groups with Japanese contribute
to a statement that their members are not likely linked to
Heart Disease. This statement means that the probability
(or weight) of the possible world w1 is much greater than
that of w2.
Most previous privacy works such as l-diversity [21], t-
closeness [17], (k, e)-anonymity [30] and m-confidentiality
[27] adopt the random world assumption locally. In this
paper, the source of attack of the adversary is to apply the
more complete model of the weighted possible worlds. We
call this kind of attack foreground knowledge attack.
1.2 Contributions
Our contributions can be summarized as follows. Firstly,
we define and study data anonymization issues in data pub-
lication with the consideration of foreground knowledge at-
tack, which is ignored in the privacy literature. Secondly,
we show how an adversary can breach privacy by comput-
ing the probability that an individual is linked to a sensitive
value by using foreground knowledge.
Finally, we have conducted experiments to show how the
adversary can succeed in foreground knowledge attack for
four recent privacy models, namely Anatomy [29], MASK
[27], Injector [18] and t-closeness [17].
We emphasize that, similar to l-diversity, all privacy mod-
els using group-based anonymization [29, 27, 18, 17] also
suffer from possible privacy breaches due to the utility of
the published table. We believe that this work is significant
in pointing out this overlooked issue, and that all followup
works should need to deter foreground knowledge attack.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
formulates the problem. Section 3 describe how the ad-
versary can breach individual privacy with the foreground
knowledge obtained from the anonymized data. Section 4
shows how the adversary can obtain the foreground knowl-
edge from the anonymized data. An empirical study is re-
ported in Section 5. Section 6 reviews the related work. The
paper is concluded in Section 7.
2. PROBLEM DEFINITION
Let T be a table. We assume that one of the attributes
is a sensitive attribute X where some values of this at-
tribute should not be linkable to any individual. The value
of the sensitive attribute of a tuple t is denoted by t.X.
A quasi-identifier (QI) is a set of attributes of T , namely
A1, A2, ..., Aq, that may serve as identifiers for some individ-
uals. Each tuple in the table T is related to one individual
and no two tuples are related to the same individual.
Let P be a partition of table T . We give a unique ID
called GID to this partition P and append an additional at-
tribute called GID to this partition where each tuple in P
has the same GID value. Existing group-based anonymiza-
tion defines a function β on P to form an A-group such
that the linkage between the QI attributes and the sensitive
attribute in the A-group is lost. There are two ways in the
literature for this task. One is generalization by generalizing
all QI values to the same value. The other is bucketization
by forming two tables, called the QI table and the sensi-
tive table, where P is projected on all QI attributes and
attribute GID to form the QI table, and on the sensitive
attribute and attribute GID to form the sensitive table. A
table T is anonymized to a dataset T ∗ if T ∗ is formed by first
partitioning T into a number of partitions, then forming an
A-group from each partition by β and finally inserting each
A-group into T ∗. For example, Table 1 is anonymized to
Table 2 by bucketization.
In known voter registration lists, the QI values can often
be used to identify a unique individual [24, 16]. We assume
that there is a mapping which maps each tuple in T to an
A-group in T ∗. For example, the first tuple t1 in Table 1 is
mapped to A-group L1.
In the following, for the sake of illustration, we focus on
discussing the anonymized table generated by bucketization,
instead of generalization. The discussion for generalization
is same as that for bucketization. Specifically, generalization
is similar to bucketization but generalization changes all QID
values in a partition to the same “generalized” values. If the
table is generated by generalization, each A-group contains
the same “generalized” values. In the worst case scenario
(which is a basic assumption in the privacy literature [22,
27, 19]), the adversary can uniquely map each individual in
an A-group by an external table such as a voter registration
list. After the mapping, each A-group contains individu-
als with the original QID values, which becomes the case
of bucketization. Thus, the discussion for bucketization still
applies in the case for generalization. The worst case sce-
nario assumption is essential in data publishing. Nobody
can afford if the privacy of an individual is breached [19].
AOL published the dataset about search logs in 2006. After
it realized that a single 62 year old woman living Georgia
can be re-identified from the search logs by New York Times
reporters, it withdraws the search logs and fired two employ-
ers responsible for releasing the search logs [5].
In the literature [29, 27, 18, 17], it is assumed that
the knowledge of the adversary includes (1) the published
dataset T ∗, (2) the QI value of a target individual, (3) an
external table T e such as voter registration list that maps
QIs to individuals [24, 16]. We also follow these assumptions
in our analysis.
The aim of privacy preserving data publishing is to deter
any attack from the adversary on linking an individual to
a certain sensitive value. Specifically, the data publisher
would try to limit the probability that such a linkage can be
established. Let us consider an arbitrary sensitive value x
for the analysis. We denote any value in X which is not x
by x.
p() Heart Disease Not Heart Disease
American 0.1 0.9
Japanese 0.003 0.997
French 0.05 0.95
Table 3: A global distribution of attribute “Nation-
ality” for our motivating example
In this paper, we consider that an adversary can obtain
additional information from the published dataset T ∗ in the
form of global distribution, which can lead to individual pri-
vacy breach. In the example in Section 1, we can mine from
the published table that the chance of Japanese suffering
from Heart Disease is low compared with American. This
pattern is from the global distribution for the attribute set
{“Nationality”}.
Consider an arbitrary sensitive value“Heart Disease”. Ta-
ble 3 shows the global distribution of attribute set {“Nation-
ality”}, which consists of the probabilities that a Japanese,
an American or a French is linked to Heart Disease. Each
probability in the table is called a global probability. The
sample space for each such probability consists of the possi-
ble assignments of the values x and x to an individual with
the particular nationality.
Each possible value in attribute “Nationality” is called a
signature. There are three possible signatures in our exam-
ple: “Japanese”, “American” and “French”. In general, there
are other attribute sets, such as {“Sex”, “Nationality”}, with
their correspondence global distributions. We define the sig-
nature and the global distribution for a particular attribute
set A as follows.
Definition 1 (Signature). Let T ∗ be the published
dataset. Given a QI attribute set A with r attributes
A1, ..., Ar. A signature s of A is a set of attribute-value pairs
(A1, v1), ..., (Ar, vr) which appear in the published dataset
T ∗, where Ai is a QI attribute and vi is a value. A tuple t
in T ∗ is said to match s if t.Ai = vi for all i = 1, 2, ..., r.
For example, a signature s can be {(“Nationality”, “Amer-
ican”), (“Sex”, “Male”)} if the attribute set A is {“Nation-
ality”, “Sex”}. For convenience, we often drop the attribute
names in a signature, and thus we refer to {“American”,
“Male”} instead of {(“Nationality”, “American”), (“Sex”,
“Male”)}. The first tuple t1 in Table 2(a) matches {“Ameri-
can”} but the second tuple does not.
Definition 2 (Global Distribution). Given an at-
tribute set A, the global distribution G of A contains a set
of entries (s : x, p) for each possible signature s of A, where
p is equal to p(s : x) which denotes the probability that a
tuple matching signature s is linked to x given the published
dataset T ∗.
For example, if G contains (“Japanese”:“Heart Disease”,
0.003) and (“American”:“Heart Disease”, 0.1), then the prob-
ability that a Japanese patient is linked to Heart Disease is
equal to 0.003 while that of an American patient is 0.1.
The global distribution G derived from the published
dataset T ∗ is called the foreground knowledge. We will de-
scribe how the adversary derives G from the published table.
Problem 1 (Foreground Knowledge). Given any
arbitrary attribute set A, we want to find the global distri-
bution G of A from published dataset T ∗.
From Section 1, we show that with the global distribution
G of attribute set {“Nationality”}, we can deduce that the
chance of Alex, an American, suffering from Heart Disease
is high. Let t be Alex and x be Heart Disease. The chance
can be formulated by p(t : x), the probability that t is linked
to x given G.
Problem 2 (Privacy Breach). Given a published
dataset T ∗, for any individual t, any sensitive value x and
any attribute set A, we want to determine whether the prob-
ability that t is linked to x denoted by p(t : x) is greater than
1/r. Individual t is said to suffer from privacy breaches if
the probability is greater than 1/r.
In this paper, we first study Problems 1 and 2. In Sec-
tion 3, we will first give how we solve Problem 2 assuming
that we are given the foreground knowledge. Then, in Sec-
tion 4, we will describe how we can mine the foreground
knowledge from the published dataset T ∗ for Problem 1.
We shall show that the two problems are intertwined, since
the global probability is derived based on the published ta-
ble, and thus depends on the probability p(t : x) for each
tuple t.
Lk an A-group (anonymized group) in the
anonymized dataset
A set of attributes e.g. {“Nationality”, “Sex”}
t1, ..., tN tuples in an A-group
s1, ..., sm signatures for A, e.g.{“American”, “Male”}
multiple tuples tj ’s can map to the same si
x a sensitive value
x¯ any value not equal to x
p(tj : x) probability that tuple tj is linked to value x
p(si : x) probability that signature si is linked to x
fi a simplified notation for p(si : x)
f¯i 1− fi
w a possible world: an assignment of the tuples
in A-group Lk to the sensitive values x and x¯
Wk set of all possible worlds w for Lk
B set of all possible worlds w in Wk
in which tj is assigned value x.
p(w) probability that w occurs given the anonymized
dataset and based on A
p(w|Lk) conditional probability that w occurs given
A-group Lk
pj,w let tj be linked to γ in w, where γ is x or x
pj,w is the probability that tj is linked to γ
Lsi set of A-groups containing tuples matching si
Lk(si) the set of tuples in Lk matching si.
ck(si : x) the expected number of tuples which match si
and are linked to x in the A-group Lk
Table 6: Notations
3. FINDING PRIVACY BREACHES
We assume that the attack is based on the linkage of an
attribute set A to a sensitive value x. We denote by x¯ any
value not equal to x. In this section, we assume that the
global distributions G for A and x have been determined
and we show how an adversary can use G to find privacy
breaches. How the global distributions can be derived is
explained in Section 4.
Suppose there are m possible signatures for attribute set
A, namely s1, s2, ..., sm. The global distribution G of A is
shown in Table 4. To simplify our presentation, the prob-
ability that si is linked to x (x), p(si : x) (p(si : x)), is
denoted by fi (f i).
Given G, the formula for p(t : x), the probability that a
tuple t is linked to sensitive value x, is derived here. Suppose
t belongs to A-group Lk. For the ease of reference, let us
summarize the notations that we use in Table 6. We shall
need the following definitions.
Definition 3 (primitive events, projected events).
A mapping t : γ from an individual or tuple t to a sensitive
value γ (x or x¯) is called a primitive event. Suppose
t matches signature s. Let us call an event for the
corresponding signature, “s : γ”, a projected event for t.
Hence, a primitive event is an event in the sample space
for p(t : x), which is the probability of the interest for the
adversary. A projected event is an event for p(s : x) which
appears in the global distribution G.
Definition 4 (possible world). Consider an A-
group Lk with N tuples, namely t1, t2, ..., tN , with sen-
sitive values γ1, γ2, ...γN , where γi is either x or x for
i = 1, 2, ..., N . A possible world w for Lk is a possible
assignment mapping the tuples in set {t1, t2, ..., tN} to
values in multi-set {γ1, γ2, ...γN} in Lk.
Given an A-group Lk with a set of tuples and a multi-
set of sensitive values. For each possible world w, according
to the global distribution G based on attribute set A, we
compute the probability p(w) that w occurs. The sample
space for p(w) consists of all the possible assignments of x
or x to a set of N tuples with the same signatures as those
in Lk.
Suppose that in a possible world w for Lk, tuple tj is linked
to γ, where γ is either x or x. Let pj,w be the probability
that tj is linked to γ.
Like [21, 29, 27], we assume that the linkage of a sensitive
value to an individual is independent of the linkage of a
sensitive value to another individual. For example, whether
an American suffers from Heart Disease is independent of
whether a Japanese suffers from Heart Disease. Thus, for a
possible world w for Lk, the probability that w occurs is the
product of the probabilities of the corresponding projected
events for the tuples t1, ...tN in Lk.
p(w) = p1,w × p2,w × ... × pN,w (1)
Suppose tj matches signature si. If tj is linked to x in w,
then pj,w = fi. Otherwise, pj,w = fi.
p(w) corresponds to the weight of w, which we mentioned
in the introduction.
The probability of Lk given T
∗ is the sum of the proba-
bilities of all the possible worlds consistent with T ∗ for Lk.
Let the set of these worlds be Wk. For w ∈ Wk, we have
p(w|Lk) =
p(w)P
w′∈Wk
p(w′)
(2)
It is easy to verify that
P
w∈Wk
p(w|Lk) = 1.
Our objective is to find the probability that an individual
tj in Lk is linked to a sensitive value x. This is given by
the sum of the conditional probabilities p(w|Lk) of all the
possible worlds w where tj is linked to x.
p(tj : x) =
P
w∈Bx
p(w|Lk) (3)
where Bx is a set of all possible worlds w in Wk in which tj
is assigned value x.
One can verify that p(tj : x) + p(tj : x) = 1.
p() x x
s1 f1 f1
s2 f2 f2
: : :
Table 4: Global distribution
p() x x
s1 0.5 0.5
s2 0.2 0.8
(a) Global distribution
w t1 t2 t3 t4 p(w) p(w|Lk)
(s1) (s1) (s2) (s2)
w1 x x x x 0.5 × 0.5 × 0.8 × 0.8 = 0.16 0.16/0.33 = 0.48
w2 x x x x 0.5 × 0.5 × 0.2 × 0.8 = 0.04 0.04/0.33 = 0.12
w3 x x x x 0.5 × 0.5 × 0.8 × 0.2 = 0.04 0.04/0.33 = 0.12
w4 x x x x 0.5 × 0.5 × 0.2 × 0.8 = 0.04 0.04/0.33 = 0.12
w5 x x x x 0.5 × 0.5 × 0.8 × 0.2 = 0.04 0.04/0.33 = 0.12
w6 x x x x 0.5 × 0.5 × 0.2 × 0.2 = 0.01 0.01/0.33 = 0.03
(b) p(w) and p(w|Lk)
Table 5: An example illustrating the computation of p(tj : x)
Example 1. Consider an A-group Lk in a published table
T ∗. Suppose there are four tuples, t1, t2, t3 and t4, and four
sensitive values, x, x, x and x in Lk. Suppose the published
table T ∗ satisfies 2-diversity.
Consider the global distribution G based on a certain QI
attribute set A which contains two possible signatures s1 and
s2 as shown in Table 5(a).
Suppose t1, t2, t3 and t4 match signatures s1, s1, s2 and s2,
respectively. There are six possible worlds w as shown in
Table 5(b). For example, the first row is the possible world
w1 with mapping {t1 : x, t2 : x, t3 : x, t4 : x}. The table
also shows the probability p(w) of the possible worlds. Take
the first possible world w1 for illustration. From the global
distribution in Table 5(a), p(s1 : x) = 0.5 and p(s2 : x) =
0.8. Hence, p(w1) = 0.5 × 0.5 × 0.8 × 0.8 = 0.16. The sum
of probabilities p(w) of all possible worlds from Table 5(b)
is equal to 0.16 + 0.04 + 0.04 + 0.04 + 0.04 + 0.01 =
0.33. Consider w1 again. Since p(w1) = 0.16, p(w1|Lk) =
0.16/0.33 = 0.48.
Suppose the adversary is interested in the probability that
t1 is linked to x. We obtain p(t1 : x) as follows. w1, w2 and
w3, as shown in Table 5(b), contain “t1 : x”. Thus, p(t1 : x)
is equal to the sum of the probabilities p(w1|Lk), p(w2|Lk)
and p(w3|Lk). p(t1 : x) = 0.48 + 0.12 + 0.12 = 0.72 which
is greater than 0.5, the intended upper bound for 2-diversity
that an individual is linked to a sensitive value.
Let |Lk| be the size of the A-group containing tj and |Wk|
be the number of possible worlds in an A-group Lk. We will
generate |Wk| possible worlds. For each possible world, we
calculate p(w) and p(w|Lk) in O(|Lk|) time. Thus, the time
complexity is O(|Lk | · |Wk|).
The time complexity depends on two factors. One is |Wk|
and another is |Lk|. (1) |Wk| is equal to C
N
n where n is
the number of tuples with x in this A-group of size N and
CNn denotes the total number of possible ways of choosing n
objects from N objects. Note that Wk is typically small be-
cause n is usually equal to a small number. For l-diversity,
algorithm Anatomy [29] restricts that each A-group contains
either l or l+1 tuples and each sensitive value x appears at
most once. Here, n is equal to 1. Thus, for each possible
x, |Wk| is at most l + 1. For Algorithm MASK [27], in our
experiment with l = 2, the greatest frequency of x in an A-
group is 8. The size of this A-group is 23. |Wk| is equal to
C238 = 490, 314. When l = 10, the greatest possible value of
|Wk| is 140,364,532. These values are small compared with
the excessive number of possible worlds studied in uncertain
data [14, 8, 9, 4, 11] (e.g., 1010
6
in [4])). In the experimental
setups in existing works [21, 29, 17, 27, 18], l ≤ 10. In other
words, Wk can be generated within a reasonable time. (2)
|Lk| is bounded by the greatest size of the A-group which de-
pends on the anonymization techniques. For example, |Lk|
is equal to l or l + 1 for algorithm Anatomy [29] restricting
that each A-group contains either l or l + 1. In our exper-
iment, |Lk| is at most 23 for algorithm MASK [27] where
l = 2.
4. MINING FOREGROUND KNOWLEDGE
We first describe how we find the global distribution G
of a certain attribute set A from the anonymized data in
Section 4.1. Next, we introduce a pruning strategy to prune
our search space of attribute sets in Section 4.2. Finally,
we describe the algorithm for finding the global distribu-
tion of multiple attribute sets and discuss its complexity in
Section 4.3.
4.1 Foreground Knowledge
In the previous section, we assume that the values of fi are
given. Here we consider how to derive fi from the published
table T ∗. We will develop m equations involving the m
variables fi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Let the set of A-groups in T ∗ be L1, ..., Lu. Let Lk(si) be
the set of tuples in Lk matching signature si. For example,
in Table 2, let si ={“American”}. Then, L1(si) contains
only the first tuple.
Let Lsi be a set of A-groups containing tuples which
match si. That is, Lsi = {Lk|Lk(si) 6= ∅}.
A ... X
s1 ... x
s1 ... x
s1 ... x
s2 ... x
s2 ... x
s2 ... x
Table 7: A
raw table
t A ... GID
t1 s1 ... L1
t2 s2 ... L1
t3 s1 ... L2
t4 s1 ... L2
t5 s2 ... L3
t6 s2 ... L3
GID X
L1 x
L1 x
L2 x
L2 x
L3 x
L3 x
(a) QI Table (b) Sensitive Table
Table 8: An example illustrating the
computation of the global distribu-
tion
fi is equal to the expected number of tuples which match
si and are linked to x in T
∗ divided by the number of tuples
which match si in T
∗. Let ck(si : x) be the expected number
of tuples which match si and are linked to x in the A-group
Lk. Then, we can express fi as follows.
fi =
P
Lk∈Lsi
ck(si : x)P
Lk∈Lsi
|Lk(si)|
(4)
The denominator is simply equal to the number of occur-
rences of si in T
∗ and which can be easily found from the
dataset. Let us consider the term ck(si : x) in the numera-
tor.
Without additional knowledge to govern otherwise, we as-
sume that the event that a tuple matching si in Lk is linked
to x is independent of the event that another tuple also
matching si in Lk is linked to x. Then we have the follow-
ing.
ck(si : x) = |Lk(si)| × p(tj : x) (5)
where tj is any tuple in Lk matching si. Note that any tj
in Lk matching si can be used here since all such p(tj : x)
values are equal. Substitute Equations (3) and (2) into the
above equation, we get
ck(si : x) = |Lk(si)| ×
P
w∈Bx
p(w)P
w′∈Wk
p(w′)
(6)
Hence, ck(si : x) is expressed in terms of probabilities p(w)
which in turn are expressed in the m variables fi (see Equa-
tion (1) where pj,w is equal to fi or f i). Here note that
fi = 1− fi.
There are m equations of the form of Equation (4) for
the expression of fi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m. These equations involve
m variables, fi. This is a classical problem of a system of
simultaneous non-linear equations, which occurs in many ap-
plications. It can be solved by conventional methods such as
Newton’s method and Bairstow’s iteration. Since Newton’s
method [10] has been known to be effective and feasible, we
choose this method for our study in this paper.
Example 2. Given a table T containing six tuples,
t1, t2, ..., t6, as shown in Table 7. If the objective of the
privacy requirement is 2-diversity, T does not satisfy 2-
diversity. Thus, an anonymized dataset T ∗ Table 8 with
three A-groups, L1, L2 and L3, is published (for each sensi-
tive value x and each A-group, the fraction of tuples with x
is at most 0.5). Note that L3 satisfies 2-diversity because,
Since x corresponds to a value not equal to x, in L3, the first
x corresponds to a value y and the second x corresponds to
another value z.
Consider the global distribution of attribute set A. There
are two possible signatures based on A, namely s1 and s2.
Thus, we have two equations with two variables, namely f1
and f2, the probabilities in the global distribution G of A as
shown in Table 4.
Consider f1. Since only A-groups L1 and L2 contain the
tuples matching s1, Ls1 = {L1, L2}.
f1 = [
P
Lk∈Ls1
ck(s1 : x)]/[
P
Lk∈Ls1
|Lk(s1)|]
L1 contains one tuple t1 matching s1 and L2 contains two
tuples t3, t4 matching s1, |L1(s1)| = 1 and |L2(s1)| = 2.
Thus,
f1 = [1× p(t1 : x) + 2× p(t3 : x)]/(1 + 2) (7)
Consider L1. There are only two possible worlds, w1 = {t1 :
x, t2 : x} and w2 = {t1 : x, t2 : x}. Note that t1 and t2
match signatures s1 and s2, respectively. p1,w1 = f1, p2,w1 =
f2, p1,w2 = f1 and p2,w2 = f2. Thus, p(w1) = p1,w1 ×
p2,w1 = f1 × f2 and p(w2) = p1,w2 × p2,w2 = f1 × f2. We
derive that
p(t1 : x) = p(w1|L1) = f1f2/(f1f2 + f1f2)
Similarly, consider L2. There are two possible worlds, w3 =
{t3 : x, t4 : x} and w4 = {t3 : x, t4 : x}. Similarly, p(w3) =
f1 × f1 and p(w4) = f1 × f1. We have
p(t3 : x) = p(w4|L2) = f1f1/(f1f1 + f1f1) = 1/2
From (7), we obtain
f1 = [f1f2/(f1f2 + f1f2) + 1]/3
= [f1(1− f2)/(f1(1− f2) + (1− f1)f2) + 1]/3
Similarly, since L1 contains one tuple t2 matching s2 and
L3 contains two tuples t5, t6 matching s2,
f2 = [1× p(t2 : x) + 2× p(t5 : x)]/(1 + 2)
= [f1f2/(f1f2 + f1f2) + 0]/3
= [(1− f1)f2/(f1(1− f2) + (1− f1)f2)]/3
With the above two equations involving two variables, we
adopt Newton’s method to solve for these variables.
Finally, we obtain f1 = 0.666667 and f2 = 0.000000.
Thus, we derive f1 = 0.333333 and f2 = 1.000000.
4.2 Pruning Attribute Sets
The adversary may choose to attack with as many at-
tribute sets as possible. Although there are many attribute
sets in the anonymized data, it is not always true that the
global distribution of each attribute set is reliable because if
the global distribution derived is based on a small sample or
a small set of tuples matching the same signature, the distri-
bution is not accurate. For example, consider attribute set
A=“Nationality” and the signature {“American”}. Suppose
there are only a few Americans, says 10 Americans, in the
published table T ∗. Intuitively, 10 Americans cannot rep-
resent a meaningful global distribution. We will make use
of the sample size studied in the literature of statistics to
determine whether the distribution is reliable or not. The
adversary can launch an attack only based on reliable dis-
tributions.
Based on studies in statistics [25], we use the following
theorem to determine the acceptable sample size (i.e., the
size of the set which contains the tuples matching the same
signature s). Let S be a random sample of tuples for a
signature s, and p be the expected fraction of tuples in S
with the sensitive value x. Let ep be the observed fraction of
tuples with the sensitive value x in the sample S. Then the
following theorem applies.
Theorem 1 (Sample Size [25]). Given an error pa-
rameter ǫ ≥ 0 and a confidence parameter σ ≥ 0, if ran-
dom sample S has size |S| ≥ 1
2ǫ2
ln 2
σ
, the probability that
|ep− p| > ǫ is at most σ.
In case the sample size is not enough to satisfy the error
bound, then uniform distribution will be assumed. The sam-
ple size satisfies the monotonicity property. Formally, with-
out loss of generality, assume that there are u attributes,
namely A1, ..., Au. Let v1 ∈ A1, ..., vu ∈ Au. Let y(v1, ..., vi)
be the number of tuples with attributes (A1, ..., Ai) equal to
(v1, ..., vi). Given a positive integer J , if y(v1, ..., vi) < J ,
then y(v1, ..., vi, vi+1) < J . With the above monotonic-
ity property, whenever we find that the sample size of
y(v1, ..., vi) is not large enough, we do not need to count
the number of the tuples with values v1, ..., vi+1 because
y(v1, ..., vi, vi+1) is also not large enough. Thus, this can
help to prune the search space.
4.3 Algorithm
In this section, we will describe how to compute the set G
of all global distributions of multiple attribute sets with the
use of the sample size just described. The steps are shown
in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Computation of the global distributions
• Step 1: For each attribute set A, we first identify the
set SA of signatures si with respect to A where each si
is matched by some tuples in T ∗ and has sufficient sam-
ple size. For example, for A = {“Nationality”, “Sex” },
a signature equal to { “American”, “Male”} is matched
by the first tuple in Table 2(a). If it has sufficient
sample size, it is stored in SA.
• Step 2: For each attribute set A, if SA is non-empty,
we calculate the global distribution of A according to
SA for each sensitive value x.
In the algorithm, Step 1 is to find all signatures with suf-
ficient sample size for each attribute set A. Similar to fre-
quent pattern mining, this step is typically computed within
a reasonable time. Let α be the time for this step. After
we have determined the sample sizes, G is used to store the
global distributions of all attribute sets each of which con-
tains signatures with sufficient sample size.
Step 2 is to calculate the global distribution ofA according
to non-empty SA for each attribute set A. In other words,
it is to find each global distribution in G. As described in
Section 4.1, for a particular global distribution, we formulate
m equations with m variables where m is the total number
of signatures for A. The average number of terms in each
equation is O(N · |Wk| · |Lsi |) where N is the average A-
group size, |Wk| is the average number of possible worlds
in an A-group Lk and |Lsi | is the average number of A-
groups with tuples matching a signature si. If Newton’s
method takes β time to find a solution, the computation
for a global distribution takes O(m · N · |Wk| · |Lsi | + β)
time. Since there are |G| global distributions, Step 2 takes
O(|G| · (m ·N · |Wk| · |Lsi |+ β)) time.
Thus, the total running time is O(α+ |G| · (m ·N · |Wk| ·
|Lsi |+β)). Note that the values of m, N , |Wk| and |Lsi | are
small and the complexity is dominated by |G| and β. But,
as the attribute set size increases, the sample size quickly
becomes insufficient, and so |G| is typically well-behaved.
From our experiments, in all of our cases, Step 2 with the
system of m equations can be solved in a relatively short
time. So, β is also a reasonable value. For the benchmark
dataset, adult, foreground knowledge can be mined within
12 minutes in all our experiments.
The probabilistic analysis is similar in nature to that stud-
ied for uncertain databases [8, 9, 4] The computation com-
plexity above is in fact much smaller than these previous
works. In [4], all results are returned within 3 hours. The
reason is that [8, 9, 4] analyze the possible worlds based on
the entire uncertain table (which can be regarded as a single
large A-group) while we analyze the possible worlds based
on a single small A-group (which is typically smaller than
the entire table).
4.4 Discussion
We have just discussed how to find the global distribution
from the published table. One may argue that the global
distribution eG found from the published table is just an ap-
proximation of the true global distribution Go found from
the original table. Thus, the privacy breaches found in Sec-
tion 3 according to eG are invalid. However, we disagree with
this argument with the following reasons.
Firstly, since the adversary does not have the true global
distribution Go (because s/he has not seen the original ta-
ble), the best adversary’s knowledge about the global distri-
bution is eG.
Secondly, an adversary with eG is more powerful and more
sophisticated than another adversary without any knowledge
about the global distribution. The former adversary is what
we are studying in this paper and can breach individual
privacy discussed in Section 3 while the latter adversary is
the normal adversary studied in the privacy literature [21,
29, 27] and cannot breach any individual privacy found by
the former adversary.
Thirdly, the adversary Ao with Go (if there is) does not
perform more serious privacy attacks compared with an ad-
versary eA with eG. We assume that an adversary Ao can have
the true global distribution Go. This means that the public
can also know Go and Go is not secret information
1.
Consider adversary eA. Before s/he obtains eG, individual
privacy (in the published table) is protected. After s/he
obtains eG (which can be found from the published table),
individual privacy breaches. There is a change of belief af-
ter s/he sees eG. There are two kinds of privacy breaches.
The first one is that an adversary can guess correctly the
true sensitive value of an individual. The second one is that
s/he can guess incorrectly the true sensitive value of an in-
dividual. For example, even if an individual is not linked
to HIV in the original table, s/he can guess that the prob-
ability that this individual is linked to HIV is very high.
1 If this is not true, one of the ways that adversary Ao
can obtain Go is to steal the original table from the data
publisher. Since s/he has the original table, the privacy
breaches found by Ao are more serious. In this paper, we
are not studying that the adversary can steal the original
table.
This is also considered as a privacy breach to this individ-
ual. The reason is that the disclosure of the high linkage
between this individual and HIV hurts the reputation of the
individual because the adversary can convince a certain set
of people that the inference procedure about individual pri-
vacy breaches was reasonable. Thus, privacy breaches found
by eA are also serious.
Consider adversary Ao. In this case, we know that Go is
a public information. Thus, the data publisher must have
already taken Go into the account to publish a table. The
claim is true because, otherwise, no individuals are eager
to disclose their information to data publisher. Thus, even
if adversary Ao sees Go, we cannot breach any individual
privacy in the published table.
5. EMPIRICAL STUDY
A Pentium IV 2.2GHz PC with 1GB RAM was used to
conduct our experiment. The algorithm was implemented in
C/C++. We adopted the publicly available dataset, Adult
Database, from the UCIrvine Machine Learning Repository
[6]. This dataset (5.5MB) was also adopted by [16, 21, 26,
12, 27]. We used a configuration similar to [16, 21, 27]. The
records with unknown values were first eliminated result-
ing in a dataset with 45,222 tuples (5.4MB). Nine attributes
were chosen in our experiment, namely Age, Work Class,
Marital Status, Occupation, Race, Sex, Native Country,
Salary Class and Education. By default, we chose the first
five attributes and the last attribute as the quasi-identifer
and the sensitive attribute, respectively. Similar to [27], in
attribute “Education”, all values representing the education
levels before “secondary” (or “9th-10th”) such as “1st-4th”,
“5th-6th” and “7th-8th” are regarded as a sensitive value set
where an adversary checks whether each individual is linked
to this set more than 1/r, where r is a parameter.
There are 3.46% tuples with education levels before “sec-
ondary”. We set ǫ = 0.01 and σ = 0.9 for sampling. That is,
the allowed relative error of sampling is 1/3.46 = 28.90%,
which is considered large. A larger allowed error means less
attribute sets can be pruned. Since there is a set G of mul-
tiple global distributions G, we can calculate p(t : x) for
different G’s and different x’s. We take the greatest such
value to report as the probability that individual t is linked
to some sensitive value since this corresponds to the worst
case privacy breach.
5.1 Privacy Breach in l-diverse Tables
In this section, we will show that foreground knowledge
attack is successful in the published data generated from
the benchmark dataset, adult, by a well-known privacy algo-
rithm, Anatomy [29]. We set l = r where l is the parameter
of l-diversity used in Anatomy. We implemented the formula
in Section 3 to calculate the probability of a privacy breach
and the formula in Section 4 to find the global distribution
from the published data. If a tuple which appears in the
published data is identified as a privacy breach by our algo-
rithm, it is said to be a problematic tuple. The tuples linking
to sensitive values in the original table are called sensitive
tuples. In this case study, we evaluate privacy breaches with
three measurements:
1. proportion of problematic tuples among sensitive tu-
ples, (this is the recall in IR research).
2. proportion of non-sensitive tuples which are identified
wrongly as problematic tuples by our algorithm,
3. the average probability by which individual privacy is
breached among all sensitive tuples.
We have conducted experiments with the variation of
r and the variation of the QI size. (1) Variation of r:
When r = 2 with default settings, the average probability
that individual privacy breaches among all sensitive tuples
is 0.8917(> 1/2). When r is increased to 4, it becomes
0.4640(> 1/4). When r increases, there is a higher chance
that a tuple forms an A-group with other tuples. Thus, the
average size of A-groups is larger. Thus, the average prob-
ability of privacy breaches decreases. We also studied the
proportion of problematic tuples among all sensitive tuples
and the proportion of non-sensitive tuples identified wrongly
as privacy breaches.
We found that, in most cases, more than 99% of sensi-
tive tuples have privacy breaches and less than 6% of non-
sensitive tuples are identified wrongly. (2) Variation of the
QI size: When the QI size is equal to 3 with default set-
tings where r = 2, the average probability causing privacy
breaches is 0.80307. When the size is increased to 8, it be-
comes 0.943526. This is because when there are more QI
attributes, it is more likely that a QI attribute (or attribute
set) gives a global distribution which can lead to privacy
breaches.
We also have a case study in the published data generated
by Anatomy. Suppose the QI attributes chosen are Age,
Marital Status and Occupation and the sensitive attribute
is Education. In the original data, there are the following 2
tuples.
Age Marital Status Occupation Education
39 Never-married Adm-clerical Bachelors
20 Married-civ-spouse Craft-repair 5th-6th
Suppose the objective of Anatomy is 2-diversity. Since
“5th-6th” is a sensitive value, Anatomy forms an A-group
containing these two tuples. However, from the global dis-
tribution derived from the published data with respect to
attribute Occupation, the probability that an individual
with Occupation=“Adm-clerical” is linked to a low educa-
tion is only 0.02 but the probability that an individual with
Occupation=“Craft-repair” is linked to a low education is
0.04. Since there is a significant difference in global dis-
tribution of attribute Occupation, the probability that the
second tuple above is linked to a low education is 0.67 (which
is greater than 0.5).
It is noted that the global distribution derived from
the published data matches the real situation that “Adm-
clerical” jobs require higher educations but “Craft-repair”
jobs does not. In other words, the foreground knowl-
edge can help the adversary to breach individual privacy.
More specifically, let us check whether the real global dis-
tribution derived from the original table is similar to the
global distribution derived from the published data. From
the original table, the probability that an individual with
Occupation=“Adm-clerical” is linked to a low education
is only 0.01 but the probability that an individual with
Occupation=“Craft-repair” is linked to a low education is
0.04. We observe that this global distribution is similar to
that derived from the published data.
With our default experimental setting using sufficient
sample size, for 2-diversity, the average relative error of the
global probabilities derived from the published data=0.7%
which achieves 99.3% accuracy. For 10-diversity, the error
increases to 5.26% where the accuracy is 94.74%. It shows
that statistically the accuracy is very high. In other words,
the foreground knowledge derived from the published data
is quite accurate compared with the knowledge derived from
the original table.
In all our experiments, privacy breaches can be found
within 12 minutes, which shows that foreground knowledge
attack can easily be realized.
5.2 Privacy Breach in Other Privacy Models
We studied privacy breaches with four algorithms,
Anatomy [29], MASK [27], Injector [18] and t-closeness [17].
They are selected because they consider l-diversity or sim-
ilar privacy requirements, so we need only set l = r. For
Anatomy, we set l = r. For MASK, the parameters k and
m used in MASK are set to r. For Injector, the parameters
minConf , minExp and l are set to 1, 0.9 and r, respec-
tively, which are the default settings in [18]. For t-closeness,
similar to [17], we set t = 0.2. We evaluate the algorithms
in terms of four measurements: (1) time for mining fore-
ground knowledge, (2) execution time, (3) the proportion of
problematic tuples among all sensitive tuples, (4) the aver-
age of the greatest difference in the global probabilities in
each A-group (In our figures, we label this as average value
of △), and (5) the relative error ratio in answering an ag-
gregate query as in [29, 27, 18] by the published data. For
each measurement, we conducted the experiments 100 times
and took the average.
We do not report the time for finding privacy breaches
because the time is very short (within a few minutes). For
the sake of space, since the proportion of non-sensitive tuples
identified wrongly for privacy breaches is small (less than
10%), we do not report here.
Let us explain measurements (4) and (5). (4) Consider
an A-group Lk contains two tuples matching signatures si
and sj , respectively. Suppose p(si : x) is the greatest global
probabilities and p(sj : x) is the smallest in the A-group.
The value of △ in Lk is equal to p(si : x) − p(sj : x). The
average value of △ is taken among all A-groups and all at-
tribute sets A with sufficient samples. (5) The relative error
ratio measures the utility of the published data. We adopt
all query parameters in [29, 27, 18]. For each evaluation, we
performed 10,000 queries and reported the average relative
error ratio.
We have conducted the experiments by varying two fac-
tors: (1) the QI size, and (2) r.
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the results when r is set to
2 and 10, respectively. Figure 1(a) shows that the time
for mining foreground knowledge increases with the QI size
because the algorithm needs to process more attribute sets.
Figure 1(b) shows that the execution time increases with
the QI size because the algorithms have to process more QI
attributes.
Figure 1(c) shows that the proportion of problematic tu-
ples among sensitive tuples increases with QI size. With a
larger QI size, there is a higher chance that individual pri-
vacy breaches due to more attributes which can be used to
construct the global distributions. MASK has fewer privacy
breaches compared with Anatomy and Injector because the
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Figure 1: Effect of QI size (r = 2)
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Figure 2: Effect of QI size (r = 10)
side-effect of the minimization of QI values in each A-group
adopted in MASK makes the difference in the global distri-
bution among all tuples in each A-group smaller. Thus, the
number of individual with privacy breaches is smaller. It is
noted that there is no violation in t-closeness. The reason
why t-closeness has no privacy breaches is due to the large
A-groups formed by global recoding with respect to value
r(= 2). The average size of the A-group in the table satisfy-
ing t-closeness is at least 4000 and the utility of the table is
low. It is noted that parameter t is independent of param-
eter r. We will show that t-closeness has privacy breaches
when r = 10.
In Figure 1(d), when the QI size increases, the average
value of △ with respect to every attribute set increases, as
shown in Figure 1(d). The average value of △ is the largest
in Anatomy and Injector, and the third largest in MASK.
This is because Anatomy and Injector does not take the
global distribution directly into the consideration for merg-
ing but MASK does indirectly during the minimization of
QI values.
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Figure 3: Effect of QI size on average relative error
Figure 3(a) shows that the average relative error of t-
closeness is the largest since it forms large A-groups by
global recoding which introduce a lot of errors and thus re-
duce the utility of the published data.
We have also conducted experiments when r = 10 as
shown in Figure 2. The results are also similar. But, the
time for mining foreground knowledge is larger. Since r is
larger and thus 1/r is smaller, the average value of △ is
smaller when r = 10. Also, when r = 10, there are privacy
breaches for t-closeness in Figure 2(c) because there is a
higher privacy requirement when r = 10 and thus the size
of the A-group is not large enough for protection.
6. RELATED WORK
With respect to attribute types considered for data
anonymization, there are two branches of studying. The
first branch is anonymization according to the QI attributes.
A typical model is k-anonymity [3, 16]. The other branch
is the consideration of both quasi-identifier attributes and
sensitive attributes. Some examples are [21], [28], [17], [18]
and [7]. In this paper, we focus on this branch. We want to
check whether the probability that each individual is linked
to any sensitive value is at most a given threshold.
l-diversity [21] proposes a model where l is a positive inte-
ger and each A-group contains l “well-represented” sensitive
values. For t-closeness [17], the distribution in each A-group
in T ∗ with respect to the sensitive attribute is roughly equal
to the distribution of the entire table T ∗. Given a real num-
ber α ∈ [0, 1] and a positive integer k, (α, k)-anonymity [28]
maintains that, for each A-group L, the number of tuples
in L is at least k and the frequency (in fraction) of each
sensitive value in L is at most α.
We emphasize that t-closeness is different from ours.
Firstly, t-closeness does not have any privacy guarantee on
the bound of breach probabilities. Like l-diversity, Anatomy
and (α, k)-anonymity, the major goal of privacy protection is
to bound the probability that an individual is linked to a sen-
sitive value at most a given threshold. However, t-closeness
has just an input parameter t expressing the bound on the
closeness between the distribution in each A-group and the
distribution of the entire table, which does not give any
bound of breach probabilities. Secondly, t-closeness does not
consider the QI attribute values for the distribution. Specif-
ically, the distribution of an A-group (or the entire table)
considered in t-closeness is the global distribution involving
the probability that an individual (with any QI attribute
values) is linked to a sensitive value. However, the global
distribution studied here involves the probability that an in-
dividual with particular QI attribute values such as Japanese
is linked to a sensitive value. Thirdly, enforcing t-closeness
gives a large distortion on the anonymized dataset. This
is because it is usually the case that a small A-group has
the distribution which is very different from the distribu-
tion of the entire table. In order to satisfy t-closeness, a
lot of A-groups should be merged to form a very large A-
group, which makes the distortion large. Fourthly, there
are not many useful patterns found in the table satisfying t-
closeness. Like [29, 30, 27], one objective to publish the table
is to analyze the correlation between some QI attributes and
the sensitive attribute. Since t-closeness restricts that each
A-group has nearly the same distribution as the distribution
of the entire table, the desired goal cannot be achieved.
In the literature, different kinds of background knowledge
are considered [21, 15, 22, 27, 20, 13, 18, 2]. [15] proposes
the statistics of some attributes such as age and zipcode
can be also available to the public. [22] considers another
background knowledge in form of implications. [27] discov-
ers that the minimality principle of the anonymization al-
gorithm can also be used as a background knowledge. [20]
proposes to use the kernel estimation method to mine the
background knowledge from the original table. [13] describes
that there are many tables published from different sources
containing overlapping individuals.
[18] finds that association rules can be mined from the
original table and thus can be used for privacy protection
during anonymization. In [2], the problem of privacy at-
tack by adversarial association rule mining is investigated.
Hence, the association rules are the foreground knowledge.
However, as pointed out in [23], association rules used in [18]
and [2] can contradict the true statistical properties. Also
the solution in [2] is to invalidate the rules, but this will
violate the data mining objectives of data publication.
A recent work [1] proposes to generate a table in form
of an uncertain data model. However, this work considers
k-anonymity which ignores any sensitive attribute.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we point out a fundamental privacy breach
problem which has been overlooked in the past. With the
consideration of the utility of the anonymized table, group
based anonymization suffers from privacy breaches. Our
experiments show that existing well-known privacy models
Anatomy, MASK, Injector and t-closeness suffer from se-
rious privacy breaches in a benchmark dataset. For future
work, we plan to study how to anonymize the data to defend
against foreground knowledge attack. In our experiment,
we observe that the chance of privacy breaches is lower if
each group contains tuples with “similar” global probabili-
ties. Thus, forming A-groups with “similar” tuples is one
possible strategy. Another future work is to study the ef-
fect of background knowledge that may be possessed by the
adversary.
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